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Solicitation and the Uncertain Status
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in Kentucky
By EUGENE R. GAETKE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1969 the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted' the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility 2 as the disci-
plinary rules binding upon attorneys practicing in the state. The
Court adopted the Code as an apparent attempt to provide the
Kentucky bench and bar the certainty and guidance offered by a
codification of the frequently subjective and occasionally neb-
ulous body of law known as legal ethics. 3 The Court used partic-
ular language in its rule4 adopting the Code, however, which
. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1971,
J.D. 1974, University of Minnesota.
I KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130, adopted by order of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, No-
vember 11, 1969.
2 The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association in 1969. For a discussion of the adoption process, see Sutton,
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48
TEx. L. REv. 255 (1969-70); Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History
and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1970-71). The Code has been recognized as controlling
authority, in full or in part, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. A. KAUFmAN,
PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 29 (1976).
3 That the Code was drafted with certainty and guidance as objectives is evidenced
by its organization into "Disciplinary Rules" (DR), which "state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action," and
"Ethical Considerations" (EC), which "are aspirational in character and represent the ob-
jectives toward which every member of the profession should strive" and which "consti-
tute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific sit-
uations." Preamble and Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY. See Sutton, supra note 2, at 258. In fact, the lack of certainty and guidance in the
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, initially promulgated in 1908,
led to the adoption of the Code. Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional
Ethics: A Revlser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REv. 132 (1965-66); Wright, supra note 2, at
3-5.
4 This ruleprovides:
Except for Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules insofar as they
conflict with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Bates v.
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renders uncertain the precise status of the Code in Kentucky. As
a result, a conscientious practitioner in Kentucky cannot confi-
dently look to the Code for resolution of ethical problems. 5
The area of client solicitation by attorneys illustrates the un-
certainty created by the Court's ambivalent adoption of the
Code. Even though the Code was drafted by the American Bar
Association partially in response to the problem of solicitation6
and even though the Code deals with the practice quite explicit-
ly, 7 the Kentucky Court's peculiar language adopting the Code
leaves the matter disturbingly unsettled."
This Article examines the language used by the Kentucky
Court in adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility9 and
the uncertainty it creates in regulating legal ethics in the state' 0
State Bar of Arizona, the court recognizes and accepts the principles em-
bodied in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity as a sound statement of the standards of professional conduct required of
members of the bar, and the Board may cause to be tried all charges brought
under this Code as well as charges for other unprofessional or unethical con-
duct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute.
KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1) (emphasis added).
See the text accompanying notes 14-26 infra for further discussion of this rule and
the language referred to in the text.
5 The Code of Professional Responsibility itself is not always helpful to the attorney
seeking guidance as to a specific ethical problem. The Disciplinary Rules are often vague.
Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 276 (1969-70); Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad v. Narrow Pro-
scriptions, 65 IowA L. REv. 1386, 1388-89 (1979-80). The problems of vagueness and oc-
casional conflict presented by the Code's provisions, of course, are only exacerbated by the
uncertainty resulting from the Kentucky Supreme Court's ambivalent adoption of them.
See the text accompanying notes 16-22 infra for a discussion of this uncertainty.
6 Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L.
REV. 497 (1978-79). Professor Sutton was the reporter for the American Bar Association
committee which drafted the Code. Id.
7 The Code prohibits an attorney from recommending to a layperson the employ-
ment of himself or herself or an associate, DR.2-103(A), requesting another to recommend
his or her employment except under certain circumstances, DR 2-103(C), or compensating
another for having recommended his or her employment, DR 2-103(B). The Code also
prohibits an attorney from accepting employment from a person after having given unsoli-
cited advice that such person should take legal action, except under certain enumerated
situations. DR 2.104(A).
8 The uncertainty about when solicitation is proper is further aggravated by deci-
sions which make even the Codes treatment of the subject constitutionally suspect. See
notes 98 and 110 infra for a discussion of these constitutional developments.
9 See the text accompanying notes 16-22 infra for a discussion of this language.
10 See the text accompanying notes 23-26 infra for a discussion of this principle.
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It then traces the erratic pre-Code treatment of solicitation in
Kentucky" to illustrate the confusion which unfortunately sur-
vives the new rule. 2 Finally, the conclusion suggests that the
treatment of solicitation and the status of the Code in Kentucky
can be clarified only by amending the Supreme Court's rule
adopting the Code.'3
I. THE ADOPTION OF THE CODE i KEkTUCKY
In Rule 3.130, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressly adopts
the Code of Professional Responsibility as "a sound statement of
the standards of professional conduct required by members of the
bar" and authorizes the board of governors of the state bar asso-
ciation to prosecute attorneys charged with violations of the
Code provisions.' 4 In catch-all language, however, the rule fur-
" See the text accompanying notes 27-85 infra for a discussion of this erratic pre-
Code treatment of solicitation.
12 See the text accompanying notes 86-98 infta for a discussion of this continuing con-
fusion.
13 See the text accompanying notes 99-110 infra for a discussion of this suggestion.
14 KY. SuP. CT. R. 3.130(1). For an historical account of the regulation of legal ethics
in Kentucky leading to the adoption of the Code, including the early concern with solicita-
tion, see Huelsmann & Deener, Legal Ethics in Kentucky: Background of the Code of
Ethcs, 42 Ky. BENCH & B. 10 (July 1978).
Unfortunately even the explicit language of Rule 3.130(1) has been interpreted by
the state Supreme Court so as to create uncertainty for members of the practicing bar. The
Court has read the rule as adopting only the Code of Professional Responsibility initially
approved by the American Bar Association in 1969. Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Wilkey, No.
80-SC-671-KB (Ky. Dec. 16, 1980). The Code, however, has been amended by the Amer-
ican Bar Association every year from 1974 through 1980.
The Court does not interpret Rule 3.130 as authority for the adoption of these
Code amendments despite amendments of Rule 3.130 itself in 1977 and 1979. Thus, an at-
torney who acts in accordance with a Code amendment may be disciplined in Kentucky
under the original version of the Code. For example, an attorney establishing a profit-
sharing compensation plan for his/her nonlawyer employees in accordance with a 1980
amendment to DR 3-102(A)(3) could be disciplined in Kentucky under the 1969 version of
that rule, which prohibited such plans. Also, an attorney who fails to disclose client per-
jury to a court because the attorney learned of the perjury through a privileged communi-
cation would be acting in accordance with a 1974 amendment to DR-7-102(B)(1) but
would be subject to discipline in Kentucky under the 1969 version of that rule.
This interpretation of Rule 3.130 is so significant that its announcement in an un-
published opinion constitutes grossly inadequate notice to the practicing bar. See Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671-KB. An amendment to Rule 3.130 expressly
designating which version of the Code is applicable in the state would be preferable. See
note 101 infra for a discussion of such an amendment and others.
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ther authorizes the board to prosecute attorneys charged with
"other unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the
bench and bar into disrepute."'-
Several interpretations of this catch-all language are possible.
At one extreme, the language appears to authorize disciplinary
proceedings against attorneys for conduct expressly permitted by
the Code, 6 although presumably it would not be so employed.'7
At the other extreme, the language might be read so as to allow
discipline of attorneys only for unethical conduct not mentioned
in the Code, thus evidencing the Court's recognition that general
ethical restraints govern novel problems. Such a reading renders
the language superfluous, however, in light of the equally broad
language of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102,18 which already serves
15 KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1). The Board of Governors of the KentuckyBar Association
is designated the agent of the state's Supreme Court for purposes of enforcing disciplinary
standards. KY. Sup. CT. B. 3.070. The Board decides disciplinary cases and determines the
appropriate discipline unless review by the state Supreme Court is sought by the respon-
dent attorney or directed by the Court. Id.
16 Conceivably, the Court might regard conduct expressly permitted under the Code
to be "unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disre-
pute." For example, while advances or guarantees of financial assistance made to clients
by attorneys during pending litigation is generally prohibited by the Code, an attorney is
expressly permitted to advance the expenses of that litigation as long as the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses. DR 5-103(B). An argument might well be made that
such a practice is unprofessional and tends to bring the bar into disrepute because it creates
at least the appearance that the attorney has acquired a personal financial stake in the out-
come of the litigation and is thus unprofessional.
17 Such use would render the adoption of the Code largely meaningless, since an at-
torney could never rely upon even the express terms of the Code without fear of being dis-
ciplined under the catch-all language. Where the Kentucky Court has disagreed with the
express requirements of the Code, it has so stated in its rules. See, e.g., KY. Sup. Cr. Rs.
3.135, 3.475-.477 (advertisement, group plans, and prepaid legal services). Thus, the
Court appears unlikely to use the catch-all language of Rule 3.130 to condemn conduct ex-
pressly permitted by the Code. See Note, supra note 5, at 1389-1400 for a discussion of the
arguments supporting broad and narrow disciplinary standards.
18 That rule provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
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that purpose within the Code itself. 9
The most likely meaning of "other unprofessional or uneth-
ical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute" is
more troubling. Frequently the Code deals with a given category
of conduct by expressly prohibiting certain actions, thus implicit-
ly permitting those actions not specifically enumerated within
the category. 20 The presence of the general language of Rule
3.130 might thus be read to allow discipline of attorneys for that
conduct implicitly permitted by the Code.2' If so, the case law
prior to the Code's adoption, which represents the Court's efforts
to define unprofessional and unethical conduct tending to bring
the bench and bar into disrepute,22 may retain some vitality in in-
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
DR 1-102(A).
19 DR 1-102(A) (3)-(6), which pertain to conduct not otherwise covered by the Codes
disciplinary rules, could be read to be coextensive with the catch-all language of Rule
3.130(1) ("other unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar
into disrepute"). If so, the catch-all language is merely redundant. While such redundancy
is plausible, it should not be presumed when a more limited and reasonable reading of the
language is possible. Such a meaning is suggested in the text accompanying notes 20-21 in-
fra.
20 A typical example is the Code requirement of disclosure of certain information to
tribunals. The Code provides:
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be di-
rectly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed
by opposing counsel.
(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients he repre-
sents and of the persons who employed him.
DR 7-106(B). No mention is made in this disciplinary rule of any requirement to disclose
to a tribunal facts known by an attorney to be adverse to the position of his or her client.
Thus the nondisclosure of such adverse factual information by the attorney is implicitly
permitted by the Code's treatment of disclosure in general.
21 In the example provided in note 20 supra, therefore, an attorney might well be
disciplined under the catch-all language of Rule 3.130 for failing to disclose facts known to
be adverse to the position of his or her client. Failure so to disclose arguably is unprofes-
sional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute because it
misleads the tribunal as to the facts involved in a pending matter.
22 See, e.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ky. 1976)
(decided according to pre-Code law); Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky.
1954); Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Mazin, 139 S.W.2d 771,772 (Ky. 1940). Until recently, the
bar association's charges against attorneys were framed in language similar to the catch-
all language. See, e.g., In re Richard, 244 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1951). This practice continued
until 1980 when in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671-KB, the Supreme Court
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terpreting Rule 3.130, particularly in instances where such case
law treats specific conduct more strictly than does the Code.
The presence of the catch-all language in Rule 3.130 is in-
deed unfortunate. At a minimum, it provides the Court an easy
avenue to avoid the difficult task of interpreting the Code itself.
Its mere presence tempts the Court to rely upon this general lan-
guage rather than the Code even where the Code clearly prohib-
its the conduct under review.0 At worst, its wording may well be
unconstitutionally vague as a disciplinary standard,24 despite the
Kentucky Supreme Court's conclusion otherwise.2s Even if con-
urged the bar association to desist in this practice and, in the future, to present the Court
with charges based on the provisions of the Code. In only one of eight disciplinary cases
decided by the Kentucky Court since Wilkey, however, has the Court stated its objections
to the attorney's conduct in terms of Code provisions.
23 The Kentucky Supreme Court has frequently succumbed to this temptation. See,
e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 613 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1981) (attorney misappropriated
client's funds, thus violating DR 9-102(B)(4), but disciplined instead under catch-all lan-
guage of Rule 3.130); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 613 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1981) (attor-
ney neglected matter, violative of DR 6-101(A)(3); violated an order of court suspending
him from practice, violative of DR 7-102(A)(8) and DR 3-101(B); made a false statement
to a court, violative of DR 7-102(A)(5); and misled his client, violative of DR 1-102(A)(4);
but disciplined instead under catch-all language of Rule 3.130); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980) (attorney knowingly making false accusation
against judge, thus violating DR 8-102(B), but disciplined instead under catch-all lan-
guage of Rule 3.130); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 554 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1977) (attor-
ney neglected matter, violative of DR 6-101(A) (3); and knowingly made false statement of
fact, violative of DR 7-102(A)(5); but disciplined under catch-all language of Rule 3.130).
See also Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem, 554 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Dillman, 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1976).
24 Even the Codes catch-all provisions, DR 1-102(A) (5)-(6) quoted in note 18, supra,
are questionable under the void for vagueness doctrine. See Weckstein, supra note 5, at
274-80; Note, supra note 5, at 1402-09; Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 671 (1979). The courts, however, have not
agreed. See, e.g., In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351 (Or. 1976). See also Sutton, supra note 6, at
502 n.13. The vagueness problems presented by the Code are increased by the unfortunate
use of Ethical Considerations by some states as the basis for disciplinary proceedings. See
Note, supra note 5, at 1388. The Ethical Considerations were not intended to be so used by
the drafters of the Code. See note 3 supra for a discussion of the purpose of the Ethical
Considerations. The Kentucky Supreme Court has, on at least one occasion, based disci-
plinary action on a finding of violation of an Ethical Consideration. KentuckyBarAss'n v.
DeCamillis, 547 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Ky. 1977). The catch-all language of Rule 3.130 is
at least as broad as that in DR 1-102 and is, therefore, subject to the same criticism.
25 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Kramer, 555 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1977). The Court further
held in Kramer that it is not necessary, in order to find a violation of the catch-all lan-
guage of Rule 3.130, for the Bar Association to introduce "proof of the manner in which
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stitutional, however, the catch-all language is disturbing because
it fails to guide attorneys as to appropriate conduct under given
circumstances. Certainly such guidance is one of the major objec-
tives underlying the codification of rules concerning legal ethics"
and the adoption of that codification by the Supreme Court.
However, by inserting the catch-all language in Rule 3.130, the
Court has largely reclaimed with one hand that which it had
given with the other. The confusion thus engendered is illus-
trated well by the status of the law governing attorney solicita-
tion in Kentucky.
II. SOLICITATION IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky's past treatment of solicitation by attorneys has, at
first glance, been lenientYv Even before the United States Su-
preme Court held certain solicitations to be protected under the
first and fourteenth amendments,'s Kentucky cases had declared
the... [conduct] . .. brought the bench and bar into disrepute." Id. at 246. The Court
also upheld the predecessor of the Code, the Canons of Professional Ethics, against attack
on grounds of vagueness, although recognizing constitutional problems in enforcing eth-
ical generalities. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574, 582-83 (Ky. 1972)
(decided after the adoption of the Code by the Kentucky Supreme Court but applying the
Canons to conduct occurring before the Code's adoption).
2 See note 3 supra fora discussion of this principle.
27 For example, in his concurring opinion in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 468-77
(1978) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468-77 (1978) Justice Marshall
refers to two Kentucky cases, Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d 773 (Ky.
1940), and Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1954), as examples of cases pro-
nouncing solicitation rules which permit what he terms "benign" solicitation. 436 U.S. at
472 n.3. Justice Marshall's definition of "benign" solicitation is:
[S]olicitation by advice and information that is truthful and that is presented
in a noncoercive, nondeceitful and dignified manner to a potential client
who is emotionally and physically capable of making a rational decision
either to accept or reject the representation with respect to a legal claim or
matter that is not frivolous.
Id. The Kentucky rule as paraphrased in the text appears to permit such "benign" solicita-
tion. See the text accompanying note 29 infra for this paraphrased rule.
28 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412; United
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 216 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (truthful newspaper advertisement regarding
availability and terms of routine legal services is speech protected by' the first and four-
teenth amendments). See note 98 infra for a discussion of these cases.
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70
that, in general, solicitation of clients by attorneys was not a
proper subject of discipline, absent any effort by the attorney to
take advantage of the ignorance, weakness, suffering, or human
frailties of the prospective client.2
A. The Origin of the Rule
The precise origino of this general rule is Chreste v. Louis-
ville Railway Company,31 a contract action. In Chreste the plain-
29 Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d at 744; Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139
S.W.2d at 775-76.
The leniency of this Kentucky solicitation rule may surprise the first-time reader.
For one thing, the rule has a certain contemporary sound to it, despite its first pronounce-
ment in 1915. See the text accompanying notes 30-38 infra for a discussion of the origins of
the rule. Solicitation of clients by attorneys has been regulated at least since the adoption
of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908. See Canons 27 and 28, discussed in notes 51-
52 infra. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 454 n.11. Only in recent
years has there been a shift in attitude regarding the practice, largely as a result of chang-
ing notions of professionalism, the sophistication of the consuming public, and the need to
make legal services available to large segments of our society. See note 27 supra for a dis-
cussion of benign solicitation. It is also surprising that such a liberal rule would prevail in a
state which regards itself as a strict disciplinarian of its practicing attorneys. See Note,
Professional Responsibility, 67 KY. L.J. 757 (1978-79). Furthermore, the rule is consider-
ably more lenient than the treatment of solicitation contained in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. See note 7 supra for the provisions contained in the Code.
30 The first Kentucky case involving solicitation is Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 176
S.W. 948 (Ky. 1915). The Court declared that the use of false statements and deceitful
practices in the solicitation of clients was the appropriate subject of suspension or disbar-
ment, but reversed the disbarment of the respondent attorney because the trial court had
tried the matter partially on affidavits. Id. at 953. While the act of solicitation was in-
volved in the case, the Court's attention instead centered on the attorney's fraudulent con-
duct, which understandably overshadowed any possible objection to the solicitation itself.
Id. Thus Lenihan is less a solicitation case than one involving conduct evidencing a lack of
that honesty and probity adequate for the continued practice of law. See the text accom-
panying notes 44-48 infra for a discussion of the historical interrelationship between prose-
cutions for solicitation and for lack of honesty and probity.
31 180 S.W. 49 (Ky. 1915). The law on solicitation of clients by attorneys in Ken-
tucky commenced with a flurry of cases between 1915 and 1917. These cases appear to be
largely the result of efforts by Judge William H. Field of the Jefferson County Circuit
Court to rid the local bar of such solicitation. Disbarment proceedings against attorneys
instituted by Judge Field, based at least in part on solicitation, resulted in decisions by the
state's highest court in Chreste v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1917); Chreste v.
Commonwealth, 186 S.W. 919 (Ky. 1916); and Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W.
948. Additionally, the Court's opinion in Chreste v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W. 919, re-
veals that such proceedings had been instituted by Judge Field against other attorneys as
well. 186 S.W. at 922. Judge Field's crusade appears to have continued for some time. See,
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tiff attorney had a contingent fee contract with a client who was
injured while as passenger on the defendant's railroad. 32 In settle-
ment with the injured passenger, the railroad agreed to pay the
attorney's fee.ss The attorney's suit to enforce this obligation was
defended by the railroad on the ground that the attorney's con-
tingent fee contract was void as against public policy because ac-
quired through solicitation.34 Although the attorney had em-
ployed a paid agent or "runner" to obtain the contract,3 the rail-
road based its defense on the broad contention that solicitation in
itself rendered the contract void as against public policy.-" Agree-
ing with that broad theory, the trial court voided the contract
upon the jury's finding that solicitation had occurredP3 The
state's highest court reversed, concluding that:
[m]ere solicitation on the part of an attorney, unaccompanied
by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or imposition of
some kind, or other circumstances sufficient to invalidate the
contract, is not of itself sufficient to render a contract between
an attorney and client void on the ground that it is contrary to
public policy.-"
Two aspects of the Chreste case, however, make it an un-
sound foundation for a disciplinary standard.", First, Chreste
was a contract action, not a disciplinary proceeding. 40 The Court
e.g., In re Carter, 139 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. 1940); Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139
S.W.2d at 775.
32 180 S.W. at50.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. The use of such runners has long been regarded as the most reprehensible form
of solicitation. See the text accompanying notes 56-57 infra for a discussion of this prin-
ciple. See also Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. R~v. 677, 685
(1953-54).
" The court noted that "the only issue submitted to the jury was whether or not the
contract was obtained by solicitation." 180 S.W. at 50.37 Id.
Id. at 53. On remand the defendant railroad's amended answer alleged that the
contract of employment was secured through the use of an agent paid a contingent fee by
the attorney for securing his employment and was thus void as contrary to pubic policy.
Chreste v. Louisville By. Co., 191 S.W. 265 (Ky. 1917). The trial court's voiding of the
contract was affirmed on appeal. Id.
39 The Court on one occasion has recognized the weakness of Chreste as a discipli-
nary precedent. See Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Mazin, 139 S.W.2d at 772.
40 180 S.W. at50.
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was confronted with the question of whether mere solicitation of
a client by an attorney rendered the resulting employment con-
tract void as against public policy. 41 Such an inquiry involved
more than merely passing on the propriety of the attorney's con-
duct in securing the contract. The Court was required to decide
the additional and more difficult question of whether that con-
duct was so injurious to the interests of the public as to justify in-
validating the contract itself.42 Thus the Court's refusal to hold
the contract void on grounds of public policy cannot logically be
read as judicial approval of the attorneys conduct.43
Second, Chreste arose at a time when solicitation may have
been frowned upon as unseemly by some members of the bar but
apparently was not regarded as an appropriate subject of disci-
pline.44 Indeed, the Court's opinion in Chreste seems to have re-
garded solicitation as a relatively standard practice.45 Solicitation
41 Id.
42 Id. at 52.
43 As the Court in Chreste noted:
[I]t must be remembered that there is a wide difference between what is un-
dignified or unbecoming conduct on the part of an attorney and what is
clearly contrary to public policy. Such conduct may be disapproved of by
the courts and by those representatives of the profession who are concerned
in seeing that its standards are never lowered, and yet it may fall far short of
being so injurious to the interest of the public as to invalidate a contract of
employment thus obtained.
Id. at 53.
"44 See L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 7
(1980). See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 210-11 (1953).
45 The Court's opinion implies that solicitation was more acceptable in 1915 than it
is today. For example, the Court notes:
There are many forms of solicitation. Some lawyers seek business by
advertising in the newspapers; others by sending out announcement cards;
others by asking friends to send them business; others by applying directly,
or through the medium of friends, for employment by firms and corpora-
tions; others buy stock in corporations, with the understandings that they
are to be employed as counsel; still others invite to their homes and frequent-
ly entertain those who are likely to require the services of an attorney.
Doubtless many solicit business in person, or through young lawyers or
agents employed for that purpose. Manifestly, if every kind of solicitation,
regardless of the form it may take, is to be condemned, then only in rare in-
stances would there be such a thing as a valid contract of employment be-
tween a lawyer and his client. If some forms are to be permitted, while
others are to be condemned, where shall the line be drawn? ... If it be
lawful for an attorney to send out announcement cards, or insert an adver-
1981-82] SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS 717
was not then prohibited in Kentucky by any statute or the com-
mon law.41 In fact, the only ground at the time for disciplining an
attorney was misconduct indicating a lack of "honesty, probity,
and good demeanor in his professional capacity." 47 Thus the
Court's lenient language as to the propriety of solicitation, per-
haps appropriate under the disciplinary standards extant at the
time, is of questionable validity under more modern, stricter
standards.4
The general rule in Chreste, therefore, was never meant as a
standard for gauging the ethical conduct of attorneys. That it
was cited as such a standard49 is indeed unfortunate.so
B. The Pre-Code Application of the Rule
In 1946 Kentucky's highest court adopted the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics5' which expressly pro-
tisement in the newspaper, or buy stock in a corporation, with the under-
standing that he is to be employed as counsel, or ask his friends to recom-
mend him for employment by firms or corporations, how can it be said that,
if he solicits business in person, or by an agent, that the public interest will
be so endangered that any contract obtained under such circumstances will
be contrary to public policy?
180 S.W. at 53. Currently attorneys would be subject to discipline for personally soliciting
business, DR 2-103(A), employing others to solicit business, DR 2-103(B), and for request-
ing friends to solicit business, DR 2-103(C). Similarly, prior to Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 433 U.S. 350, at least, advertisements by attorneys in newspapers were prohibited.
DR 2-101. Thus the Court in Chreste apears to condone several forms of solicitation
which were subsequently prohibited. Additionally, the Court noted that "it is difficult to
perceive upon what theory [solicitation] can be said to be clearly injurious to the public
good." 180 S.W. at 53.
46 Id.
47 Chreste v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W. at 927; Commonwealth v. Roe, 112 S.W.
683,685 (Ky. 1908).
48 See, e.g., the Canons of Professional Ethics, discussed in notes 51-52 infra, and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, discussed in notes 2 and 7 supra.
49 See, e.g., Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d at 775.
W Certainly it is not immediately apparent that the standard for disciplining an at-
torney for engaging in solicitation should be the same as that necessary to invalidate a con-
tract on public policy grounds. See the text accompanying notes 39-43 supra for a discus-
sion distinguishing these two grounds. To equate the two standards without explanation
leaves open the inference that the difference between the two contexts was not perceived.
51 The Canons of Professional Ethics were the result of the first effort by the Amer-
ican Bar Association to formalize standards of professional ethical conduct and were ap-
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hibited solicitation by attorneys.5 2 Nevertheless, the Kentucky
Court continued to reiterate the Chreste rule,- thus signifying
apparent continued approval of what might be termed "benign"
solicitation.-4 The actual holdings of a number of post-Chreste
cases, however, indicate less than strict adherence to that notion.
In fact, rather than being remarkably lenient,-' the Kentucky ap-
proach to attorney solicitation has been, in some respects, signif-
icantly more stringent than that of other jurisdictions.
One form of solicitation which the Kentucky Court has uni-
formly disapproved ofi6 is solicitation by paid agents, or so-called
"runners." Moreover, the Court has disciplined attorneys em-
proved by that body in 1908. It was not until 1946, however, that Kentucky officially
adopted the Canons for use in disciplinary proceedings. The Courts order provided:
The Court recognizes and accepts the principles embodied in the
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics as a
sound statement of the standard of professional conduct required of mem-
bers of the Bench and Bar, and the Court regards these Canons as persuasive
authority in all disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar.
KY. CT. APp. R. 3.170 (May 14,1946). (Emphasis added.)
52 Canon 27 provided: "It is unprofessional conduct to solicit professional employ-
ment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or in-
terviews not warranted by personal relations." Canon 28 also provided: "It is unprofes-
sional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so."
0 See, e.g., Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d at 744.
54 See note 27 supra for a discussion of benign solicitation.
5 See the text accompanying notes 27-29 supra for a discussion of the factors suggest-
ing a lenient approach in Kentucky.
56 See, e.g., In re Carter, 139 S.W.2d 754; Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Mazin, 139
S.W.2d 771; Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d 773; Chreste v. Common-
wealth, 198 S.W. 929.
57 Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d at 774; Chreste v. Commonwealth,
186 S.W. at 926. Such agents are also sometimes referred to as "touters." See, e.g., Canon
27, American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, quoted in note 52 supra.
The Chreste case, discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-50 supra, involved
the use of runners. Indeed, the use of runners in Chreste eventually resulted in the loss of
the attorney's fee, see note 38 supra, and his disbarment as well. See Chreste v. Common-
wealth, 186 S.W. 919 (attorney's disbarment for use of runners reversed because trial
court tried matter largely by affidavits); Chreste v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W. 929 (attor-
ney's disbarment for use of runners affirmed). The full panorama of the litigation involv-
ing Chreste reveals just how fortuitous Kentucky's general rule on solitication was. The
defendant railroad in the initial Chreste case did not adequately raise the issue of the use of
a runner by the attorney. Thus, the general rule as pronounced in Chreste was the result of
careless trial advocacy. See the text accompanying notes 35-36 supra for a description of
the nature of this carelessness.
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ploying such agents without regard to the benign nature of the
solicitation utilized by the agent.- The Court's obvious distaste
for such practices is evidenced by its disapproval of other types of
lay solicitation, some of which traditionally have been 'regarded
as acceptable. 59 For example, the court in In re Richardm disci-
plined an attorney in part because his father-in-law had solicited
personal injury cases for him.' Nowhere was it alleged that the
attorney had paid his father-in-law for such solicitation 62 or, in-
deed, that he had even asked his father-in-law to engage in solici-
tation." The attorney's apparent acquiescence in and knowing
acceptance of the results of that solicitation were deemed to be
sufficient grounds for discipline. 4 Thus Richard indicates the
pre-Code Kentucky Court's apparent disapproval of what has
generally been regarded as the only acceptable way of attracting
new clients, namely, unrequested and uncompensated referrals
by others,6s at least where there is a regular pattern of such refer-
rals.
Solicitation which tends to instigate litigation is another cat-
egory of otherwise benign solicitation which resulted in disci-
58 See In re Richard, 244 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1951), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 60-65 infra.
59 See note 65 infra for a discussion of this principle.
60 244 S.W.2d 476.
61 Id. at 477.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 477-78.
6 The Canons of Professional Ethics applicable at the time In re Richard was de-
cided expressly prohibited only the use of "touters," Canon 27, and the employment of
"agents or runners," Canon 28. While the Canons may be read to prohibit the use of un-
compensated agents, they certainly do not appear to prohibit an attorney from accepting
employment referred to him or her by one not requested to do so.
The Kentucky Supreme Court had earlier indicated its disapproval of unre-
quested, uncompensated solicitation by laypersons in In re Carter, 139 S.W.2d 754. In re-
sponse to the assertion that the attorney had used an agent to solicit personal injury cases,
the attorney offered proof that the so-called agent was not authorized to solicit for him nor
promised any reward for doing so. Id, at 755. The Court responded: "In doing so he fails
to consider the main portion of the ... [prospective client's] ... testimony, which is not
impeached, and which we conclude shows that [the purported agent] .... at the time,
was using his efforts in behalf of... [the attorney] .... I d. The Court apparently
thought the mere existence of lay solicitation conclusive of impropriety, despite an alleged
lack of request to solicit or compensation for having done so by the attorney.
The Code does not prohibit unrequested, uncompensated lay solicitation. See note
7 supra and the text accompanying note 93 infra for discussions of Code provisions.
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pline in Kentucky prior to the adoption of the Code.66 The pre-
Code Kentucky Court disciplined attorneys who engaged in non-
fraudulent, non-oppressive solicitation when litigation was the
subject matter of the employment sought.67 In one case, the
Court extended its prohibition to an attorney who had offered his
services to other attorneys to assist in the collection of unsatisfied
judgments. The Kentucky Court's treatment of this kind of soli-
citation again has been more strict6 than in most other jurisdic-
0 The tendency of solicitation to instigate litigation is frequently asserted as a justifi-
cation for broadly prohibiting solicitation. See Note, supra note 35, at 678; Note, Advertis-
ing, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J.
1181, 1188-89 (1971-72); Comment, Attorney Solicitation and the Threat of Bar Sanc-
tions: A Hindrance to JusticeforAlIP, 50 Miss. L.J. 419,430-31 (1979); Comment, A Crit-
ical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 675-78
(1957-58).
67 Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Stivers, 475 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1971); Petition of Hub-
bard, 267 S.W.2d743.
6 Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d 743. The attorney sought an advisory opinion
regarding the propriety of his plan to search the records of state courts for unsatisfied judg-
ments and to offer his services to the attorneys of record for purposes of collecting the judg-
ments. Id. The Court agreed with the Kentucky Bar Association's Board of Bar Commis-
sioners that such conduct would violate Canon 28 of the American Bar Association's
Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 28 provides in part:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, ex-
cept in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so .... It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect
judgment ....
The Canons were regarded as "persuasive authority" by a rule of the state's highest court.
See note 51 supra for a discussion of the Court's treatment of the Canons. The court in
Hubbard apparently considered irrelevant the fact that the proposed solicitation would be
directed only at other attorrieys. Under the currently applicable Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in Kentucky, such solicitation of attorneys by attorneys is permissible.
A lawyer shall not recommend employment as a private practitioner, of
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his ad-
vice regarding employment of a lawyer.
DR 2-103(A) (emphasis added).
The above version of DR 2-103(A) is the original 1969 language which is still in
force in Kentucky. See note 14 supra for a discussion of the implications of having the 1969
version still in force. In comparison, the current rule as amended by the American Bar As-
sociation reads:
A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend em-
ployment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a
layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
DR 2-103(A) (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Stivers, 475 S.W.2d 900. The attorney had
permitted a letter to be sent on his stationery to a victim of an automobile accident. The
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tions, where solicitation directed at other attorneys is permissible
even though the solicitation pertains to litigation.70
Finally, in at least one pre-Code case, the Kentucky Court
discarded the Chreste rule altogether and disciplined an attorney
for personally engaging in apparently benign solicitation. In In
re Rielly,71 the respondent attorney had drafted several codicils to
a will for the testator and also represented a trust of the testator
at the time of the testator's death.7 2 One of the named co-exec-
utors of the will selected the respondent attorney to represent the
estate, but the other co-executor chose another attorney.7 3 The
respondent attorney then met with and telephoned the reluctant
co-executor to solicit approval of his employment representing
the estate.74 The co-executors ultimately agreed to joint represen-
tation of the estate by the two attorneys separately favored by
each co-executor.75 After a satisfactory and competent conclusion
of the proceedings, however, the reluctant co-executor sought
disciplinary action against the respondent attorney.76 If ever
there were facts suitable for the application of the Chreste rule,
the Rielly case presented them. Indeed, the Court recognized the
"forceful and aggressive" personality and business experience of
the solicited client,77 and that the attorney's efforts "were in the
nature of efforts to make a business arrangement at arms [sic]
length, rather than attempts to exert influence upon a suscepti-
ble, inexperienced prospective client."78 Furthermore, the Court
letter merely advised the victim that the attorney handled such cases, that he was ad-
mitted to practice in both Kentucky (where the victim resided) and Indiana (where the ac-
cident occurred), that the attorney was willing to handle this case, and that the victim
should call for an appointment if she desired to avail herself of the attorney's services. Id.
at 901. Clearly the letter contained no hint of "fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence,
or imposition of some kind," as required under the Chreste rule. See the text accompany-
ing note 38 supra for a description of the Chreste rule. The fact that the solicitation sought
employment for the purpose of instituting litigation, however, was deemed sufficient to
justify the attorneys suspension from practice for one year. Id. at 905.
70 The Code makes no such distinction. SeeDR 2-103(A)-(C).
71 310 S.W.2d524 (Ky. 1957).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 524-25.






expressly recognized that this case presented an unusual solicita-
tion context where an attorney, already selected by one co-exec-
utor, was merely trying to convince the other as to his employ-
ment. 7 Nevertheless, the Court publicly reprimanded the attor-
ney for his conduct,1° concluding that the attorney's persistence
in seeking such employment warranted discipline."' More re-
markable, however, is the Court's failure even to mention
Chreste or any of the cases reiterating the Chreste rule.
The pre-Code treatment of solicitation in Kentucky, there-
fore, was considerably different than the simple, lenient rule an-
nounced in Chreste and reiterated thereafter.82 Benign solicita-
tion was prohibited when regularly done by a layperson8 or
when the subject matter of the solicitation involved litigation,
even when that solicitation was directed at another attorney.84
Moreover, even where the Chreste rule appeared appropriate,
the Kentucky Court occasionally chose not to follow it.8
C. The Rule and Kentucky's Adoption of the Code
The Kentucky Supreme Court's adoption of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility86 should have largely eliminated the con-
fusion engendered by its pre-Code treatment of solicitationY
The Code directly prohibits the solicitation of laypersons by at-
torneys or their agents. Because of the catch-all language used
by the Court in adopting the Code,89 however, the confusion re-
mains.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 526.
81 Id.
82 See the text accompanying notes 30-48 supra for a discussion of this principle.
83 See the text accompanying notes 56-65 supra for a discussion of these cases.
84 See the text accompanying notes 66-70 supra for a discussion of this treatment.
85 See the text accompanying notes 71-81 supra for a discussion of a case not follow-
ing the Chreste rule even when applicable to its facts.
8 See note 4 supra for the text of the rule adopting the Code in Kentucky.
87 See the text accompanying notes 27-85 supra for a discussion of the confusion
created by the Kentucky court's treatment of solicitation before its adoption of the Code.
88 DR 2-103(A)-(C). See note 7 supra for relevant Code provisions.
89 See note 4 supra and the text accompanying notes 15-26 supra for a discussion of
the catch-all language and the resulting confusion.
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The Code does apply to the extent that it is stricter than the
pre-Code treatment of solicitation in Kentucky. Thus, regardless
of pre-Code leniency as to benign solicitation, 90 the Code has pro-
vided the minimum level of acceptable conduct since 1969. No
case since that time indicates the survival of the lenient Chreste
rule in the face of the stricter Code provisions. 91
Kentucky's pre-Code treatment of solicitation, however, was
in some respects more stringent than the Code's treatment. As
noted above, prior to the Code's adoption, attorneys in Kentucky
had been disciplined for engaging in solicitation directed at other
attorneys when the employment sought involved litigation 92 and
90 See note 27 supra for a discussion of benign solicitation. The Code proscribes even
benign solicitation. DR 2-103(A)-(C) and DR 2-104(A).
91 One case arising since Kentucky's adoption of the Code, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978), might be read as a reassertion of the Chreste rule, per-
mitting benign solicitation, despite the stricter Code provisions. In Stuart two attorneys
mailed letters to real estate agencies advising the recipients that the attorneys engaged in
real estate practice, listing their fees for title opinions and document preparation, and
making certain guarantees regarding their work. Id. at 933. The Board of Governors of
the state bar association found such conduct violated DR 2-103(A) and recommended that
the attorneys be publicly reprimanded. Id. at 933-34. The Court disagreed, however, and
dismissed the complaint. Because the solicitation was benign, see note 27 supra, the
Court's action might be viewed as a reaffirmation of the Chreste rule. The Court in
Stuart, however, regarded the letters not as solicitations but as advertisements. Id. at 934.
Thus, the Court reasoned, the letters fell within the rule of Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350. That is, the speech contained in the letters could only be regulated upon a show-
ing by the state of sufficient justification exceeding the individual and societal interests in
free speech. 568 S.W.2d at 934. The Bar Association, having failed to make such a show-
ing, was thus prohibited from disciplining the attorneys by the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. Because of the Court's treatment of these letters as advertisements, it
avoided the troubling question of the constitutionality of the solicitation provisions of the
Code. See note 98 infra for a discussion of constitutional issues. The only other Kentucky
solicitation case arising under the Codes provisions is Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Albert, 549
S.W.2d 295 (Ky. 1976), where the Court summarily affirmed the public reprimand of an
attorney for an undisclosed violation of DR 2-103.
In an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court found solicitation by a legal aid at-
torney of a plaintiff in a civil rights action to be acceptable under DR 2-103(D) (1) (c). Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671-KB (Ky. Dec. 16, 1980). The Court stated:
This cotk't has extreme distaste for any kind of solicitation of business by a
member of the bar, whether or not it is for personal remuneration. It is not
in keeping with what we regard as respectable professionalism. Neverthe-
less, there is the rule in black and white, and it does not leave very much
room for argument.
Id.
92 See the text accompanying notes 66-70 supra for a discussion of the practice. The
Code prohibits only the solicitation of laypersons. DR 2-103(A).
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for accepting employment resulting from regular, but unre-
quested and uncompensated solicitation by laypersons on their
behalf.91 Since the Court regarded such practices as unprofession-
al or unethical conduct prior to 1969,14 it is possible that the
catch-all language of Rule 3.130 permits disciplining attorneys
for engaging in such practices, despite the Code's implicit appro-
val of those practices. 95
Rule 3.130's catch-all language makes the Code a mere min-
imum below which an attorney's conduct may not ethically fall.
Thus, an attorney can be sure that violating DR 2-103(A)9 may
result in discipline but cannot be sure that complying With that
disciplinary rule will shield him or her from discipline. 97 What-
ever certainty the Code's treatment of solicitation may have of-
fered, therefore, is largely lost. 8
93 See the text accompanying notes 60-65 supra for a discussion of the Court's disci-
pline for such conduct. The Code prohibits an attorney from requesting another to recom-
mend his or her employment except under certain circumstances, DR 2-103(C), and com-
pensating another for having recommended his or her employment, DR 2-103(B). By im-
plication, therefore, the Code approves of unrequested, uncompensated recommendations
and referrals.
94 See the text accompanying note 22 supra for a discussion of the Court's treatment
of such conduct prior to 1969.
9 See notes 92 and 93 supra for discussions of relevant Code provisions.
96 The rule provides: "A lawyer shall not... recommend employment as a private
practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought his ad-
vice regarding employment of a lawyer." DR 2-103(A). For the 1969 version of this rule,
applicable in Kentucky, see note 68 supra.
97 For example, the solicitation of employment from another attorney is permissible
under DR 2-103(A), which limits its proscription to solicitation directed at laypersons. If
the subject matter of such solicitation is litigation, however, that solicitation may be
viewed in Kentucky as unprofessional or unethical conduct. See the text accompanying
notes 67-70 and note 92 supra for discussions of this view. Thus conduct implicitly permis-
sible under the Code is an appropriate subject of discipline under the catch-all language of
Rule 3.130.
98 To add to the uncertainty, the Code provisions regarding solicitation may be sub-
ject to challenge under the first and fourteenth amendments. The United States Supreme
Court has upheld DR 2-103(A) and 2-104(A) asapplied to in-person solicitation for pecu-
niary gain under circumstances likely to result in fraud, undue influence, intimidation, or
overreaching. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447. Solicitation seeking litigants
to further civil rights and other public interests, however, has been held to be political ex-
pression and association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Broad pro-
scriptions of such solicitation were struck down in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412; United
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576; United Mine Workers of
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III. THE OBVIOUS SOLUTION
The catch-all language of Rule 3.130 causes substantial, un-
necessary uncertainty, not only in the area of solicitation, but
throughout the regulation of legal ethics in Kentucky.99 To allevi-
America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; NAACPv. Button, 371 U.S. 415.
Furthermore, the Court has held truthful newspaper advertising regarding the
availability and cost of routine legal services to be protected speech, though commercial
rather than political in nature, under the first and fourteenth amendments. Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350. In Bates, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the problem of
direct solicitation. Id. at 366. The Bates decision led to the revision of DR 2-101, see House
of Delegates Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package of Grand Jury Reforms, 63
A.B.A. J. 1234 (1977), and to the qualifying language of the Kentucky Supreme Court's
amended rule adopting the Code. See note 4 supra for the language of this amendment.
Thus the large question remaining is whether direct solicitation for pecuniary gain
not likely to result in fraud, undue influence, intimidation, or overreaching, (that is, be-
nign solicitation), should be treated as constitutionally protected speech, like advertising.
Both solicitation and advertising are efforts seeking employment by prospective clients.
They are distinguishable largely by the audience to which they are addressed. Solicitation
"implies personal petition to a particular individual to do a particular thing... [and ad-
vertising implies] . . . the calling of information to the attention of the public .... "
Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 412 N.E. 2d 927,931 (N.Y. 1980).
While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, several state
courts have, at least in the context of direct mail solicitation for pecuniary gain. Some of
these states have held such solicitation is constitutionally-protected speech. See Bishop v.
Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart,
568 S.W.2d 933; Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 412 N.E.2d 927. Other states have refused to
do so. See Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1981); Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978); Allison v. Louisiana State Bar
Assn, 362 So. 2d489 (La. 1978).
Following its decision in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (discussed
in note 91 supra), the Kentucky Supreme Court amended its own rule on advertisement of
legal services to expressly permit the direct mailing of advertising materials to potential
clients. KY. SuP. CT. R. 3.135, amended May 14,1979, effective July 1,1979. See note 110
infra for further discussion of this rule. The rule does not permit other forms of solicita-
tion. Thus, the question remains in Kentucky whether forms of benign pecuniary solicita-
tion other than direct mailings are protected speech under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Until that question is resolved the Kentucky Supreme Court's treatment of
solicitation under the Code and its own rule remains constitutionally questionable.
For the contention that even in-person benign solicitation is constitutionally pro-
tected speech, see Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First
Amendment, 93 WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 108 (1978); Note, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of
State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 144, 163-65, 175-78
(1978-79); Note, supra note 66, at 1185-91.
99 For example, prior to the adoption of the Code, the Kentucky Court held that an
attorney's failure to file federal income tax returns was not a crime involving moral turpi-
tude but was the appropriate subject of discipline nonetheless. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
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McAfee, 301 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Ky. 1957). Under the Code, illegal conduct by an attorney
is the appropriate subject of discipline if it involves moral turpitude, or if it involves "dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation," or if it otherwise "adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law." DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) and (6). Despite the Code provisions, the
Court has used the catch-all language of Rule 3.130 to discipline attorneys who fail to file
income tax returns. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Kramer, 555 S.W.2d 245; Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Taylor, 549 S.W.2d at 509; Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Trimble, 540 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Ky.
1976); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d at 173. The Kentucky Court has,
therefore, continued its pre-Code practice of disciplining such attorneys merely because of
the effect of such conduct on the image of the profession rather than because of the more
narrow concerns of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (6).
Another example of stricter pre-Code case law which may survive Kentucky's
adoption of the Code is in the area of conflicts of interest. In In re Ray, 390 S.W.2d 899
(Ky. 1965), the Court disciplined an attorney for his conduct in assisting a client to avoid a
mortgage foreclosure. The client transferred the subject real property to the attorney, as
trustee, under an agreement whereby the attorney would transfer it back to the client or
his designee upon payment of the attorney's fee and a charge for the use of the attorney's
credit. The foreclosure was avoided, and the property was transferred to the client's desig-
nee. After payment of his fee, the attorney claimed the $1,300 remaining from the transfer
of the property. Id. at 900. The Court found such a result objectionable. The Court stated:
What is significant is that [the client] came to [the attorney] owning a sub-
stantial equity in a piece of real estate, and when his dealings with [the at-
torney] were completed he had nothing while [the attorney] had $1,300.
Obviously there was a breach of professional ethics in the achievement of
such a result, and it is immaterial by what name the breach be called. We
think also it is immaterial (except as regards the degree of the offense) that
[the attorney] may have done what he did with full agreement of [the
client]. It is our opinion that an attorney may not properly be permitted to
switch hats, from that of an officer of the court to that of a moneylender, in
the middle of his dealings with a client.
Id. The attorney's conduct does not necessarily violate the subsequently adopted Code. At-
torneys may engage in business transactions with clients under DR 5-104(A) so long as the
client consents after full disclosure. The Codes prohibitions of attorneys acquiring propri-
etary interests in the subject matter of the representation are limited to matters involving
litigation. DR 5-103(A). Furthermore, an attorney's fee is not objectionable under the
Code unless it is "illegal or clearly excessive." DR 2-106(A). The catch-all language of Rule
3.130, however, raises the question whether the stricter pre-Code view in In re Ray gov-
erns rather than the more lenient Code provisions.
An excellent example of the uncertainty created by the presence of the catch-all
language in Rule 3.130 is presented by Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Graves, 556 S.W.2d 890
(Ky. 1977). In Graves, the attorney agreed to represent a claimant in a personal injury ac-
tion under a 40% contingent fee agreement. The attorney also received a $500 retainer
and required the pre-payment of $1,000 (and later an additional $1,840.65) for litigation
expenses. Id. at 890-91. Charges by the attorney against the expense account included sev-
eral items of regular overhead (such as law clerk wages and secretarial expenses) as well as
an expensive dinner with a medical expert. Id. at 891. The Court found this conduct to be
particularly offensive, only reluctantly affirming the Bar Association's recommendation of
a public reprimand rather than imposing a harsher sanction. Id. at 892. Apparently the
Court was incensed at the amount of compensation obtained by the attorney under the ar-
rangement. The Court chose not to review the conduct under DR 2-106(A), which pro-
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ate this uncertainty, the rule'00 should be amended to delete that
troublesome catch-all language.l1
0
By limiting the discipline of attorneys to offenses committed
under the Code, the Court would clarify greatly the status of the
Code in the state. The general provisions of DR 1-102102 would
still provide sufficiently flexible authority to discipline attorneys
for offensive conduct not falling within the more specific provi-
sions of the Code. But the bar association in making its charges0 3
and the Court in deciding disciplinary cases'04 would be confined
to the language of the Code itself. Gone would be the temptation
to style violations under the catch-all language, even in the face
of applicable Code provisions. 10 5 Furthermore, since the Court
would be called upon to interpret only the language of the Code,
gone also would be the possibility of finding ethical violations in
conduct expressly or implicitly permitted by specific Code provi-
sions. 10
Such an amendment need not lessen the rigor of the ethical
restraints imposed upon attorneys practicing in Kentucky. It
would alter the current regulation of ethics in only one signif-
icant respect. Rather than proceeding on a case-by-case basis un-
der the present catch-all language, the Court would either apply
a specific Code provision or, if it considered the provision too le-
hibits "clearly excessive" fees and DR 2-106(B), which provides the factors for determining
such fees. Instead the Court responded to its visceral feeling that such a financial arrange-
ment was unethical, stating that it was "difficult... to comprehend an attorney with a
full-time practice to expect his clients to meet his overhead expenses." Id. The Kentucky
Court's attitude preferring general over specific restraints on attorneys' conduct was fur-
ther indicated by its statement that the attorney "needed no disciplinary regulation to tell
him right from wrong." Id.
100 See note 4 supra for the text of Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1).
101 The proposed amendment would delete the words "as well as charges for other
unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute."
See note 4 supra for the text of the rule as it now reads.
The amendment should also expressly designate the version of the Code which
the Court is adopting. See note 14 supra for a discussion of why such an amendment is
necessary. Alternatively, the Court could have the entire Code reproduced as Supreme
Court Rules rather than adopting them by reference.
102 See note 18 supra for the text of DR 1-102.
1'3 See KY. SUP. CT. Rs. 3.070 and 3.370.
104 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.370(5)-(9).
105 See the text accompanying note 23 supra for a discussion of this temptation.
106 See the text accompanying notes 16-19 and 92-95 supra for discussions of this po-
tential.
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nient, use its rulemaking powers to adopt its own ethical rule on
that subject.10 7 The benefit of such an approach is obvious. Prac-
ticing attorneys could rely on the express provisions of the Code.
When the state's Supreme Court chose to be more strict than the
Code, it would publish a new rule, putting the practicing bar on
adequate notice of the new standard.0 At last, the benefits of-
fered by the codification of the rules concerning legal ethics'0 9
would be available to Kentucky attorneys. 10
CONCLUSION
The catch-all language utilized by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility creates
unnecessary uncertainty as to solicitation by attorneys and as to
legal ethics in general. It presents an easy, unfortunate alterna-
tive to careful construction of the Code and allows disciplinary
actions against attorneys for conduct authorized by the Code. To
clarify the presently uncertain status of the Code in Kentucky,
the rule should be amended to delete the catch-all language.
107 The Court has exercised this power to promulgate rules governing several areas of
professional conduct. See KY. Sup. Cr. Rs. 3.135, 3.475, 3.476, and 3.477 (regulating ad-
vertisements, group legal services and prepaid legal services).
108 When reviewing actions by administrative agencies, courts reveal a strong pref-
erence toward rulemaking over adjudication for the declaration of new regulatory prin-
ciples. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947); Bell Telephone Co. v.
FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1265 (3d Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854,
860 (2d Cir. 1966). While a court ordinarily is able to announce new doctrines and prin-
ciples only in the context of adjudications, B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185 (1976),
in the field of legal ethics the Kentucky Supreme Court, like an administrative agency,
also has available its rule-making authority. See KY. SuP. CT. R. 1.010. Thus the Court in
announcing new ethical restrictions is able to effectuate the general judicial preference for
rule-making over adjudication for such proclamations.
109 The Code itself, of course, sometimes is vague and not helpful. See note 5 supra
for further development of this point.
110 Although the suggested amendment of Rule 3.130 would eliminate the uncertain-
ty engendered by the rule's catch-all language, it would leave the constitutional uncertain-
ty regarding the present Code prohibitions of solicitation. See note 98 supra for a discus-
sion of constitutional issues in the Code. A recent amendment to the Kentucky Supreme
Court's rule regarding advertisement, Rule 3.135, clarifies one ambiguity under the
Codes treatment of solicitation. The amended rule permits the direct mailing of advertis-
ing to potential clients, a practice generally regarded as a form of solicitation. See L. AN-
DREWS, supra note 44, at 63-66. See also cases cited in note 98 supra. The rule prohibits
such direct mailings, however, if they are "prompted or precipitated by a specific event or
SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general
public." KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.135. While the rule thus expands the category of acceptable so-
licitation beyond that authorized by the Code, it does not authorize in-person benign soli-
citation or direct mailings prompted by a specific event, such as an accident, a death, or a
listing of real estate for sale. A reasonable question remains, therefore, of whether the rule
as amended is constitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments. See note 98 supra
for a discussion of these constitutional issues.
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